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CATV REGULATION: A .. JUMBLE
OF JURISDICTIONS
MICHAEL BOTEIN*

The community antenna television (CATV) industry is rapidly
becoming a major element of the communications media. Unfortunately, attempts to regulate the industry have not kept pace.
Local, state and federal authorities were slow to recognize the need
for CATV regulation and, when they fittally entered the field, their
efforts were uncoordinated and inadequate. But, recent activity in
the field by city and state authorities, the Federal Communications
Commission and the Congress signals the emergence of a multijurisdictional system of CATV regulation. The author describes
this system and suggests improvements that will encourage CATV
to realize its full potential.

HE explosive growth of CATV was anticipated by few comT munications
experts and even fewer governmental officials.
When the need for regulation finally became apparent, however,
response came from every governmental level-cities, states and
the Federal Government. This surge of activity has produced a
regulatory nightmare, haunted by overlapping jurisdictions and
conflicting regulations. Although relief is not yet in sight, resolution of the major issues has at least begun.
I
LOCAL AND STATE REGULATION

In TV Pix, Inc. 'V. Taylor1 the Supreme Court by way of a
no-opinion affirmance held that states, and by implication local
governments, had the power to regulate those aspects of CATV
upon which the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) had
not acted. The Court's summary disposition of the issue indicates
a more or less blanket grant of authority, but the three-judge
district court's opinion raises a noteworthy question. The lower
court held that state regulation of CATV did not unduly burden
interstate commerce since a CATV, even though clearly within
the federal commerce power,2 is basically a local operation and
thus not subject to any risk of multiple and inconsistent regulation by different states.3 Although sensible in the context of TV

*

Assistant Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. B.A., 1966, Wesleyan University; J D., 1969, Cornell University.
1 396 U.S. 556 (1970), aff'g memo 304 F. Supp.459 (D. Nev. 1968).
2 United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 168-69 (1968).
8 304 F. Supp. 459, 463 (D. Nev. 1968). The court also held that the FCC had
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Pix, i.e., CATV operation solely within the state of Nevada, the
reasoning of the decision does not solve the problems raised by
CATV operation in more than one municipality or state. Inconsistent regulation here would whipsaw the CATV, and thus
pose, by analogy to the common carrier cases,4 the thorny constitutional problem of deciding which regulatory scheme to sustain.
With the exception of such literally borderline cases, however,
TV Pix is a fairly reliable grant of power. Realistically, the
Supreme Court could have reached no other result since state
and local governments were already deeply entrenched in the
field.
A. Local Regulation
Perhaps the safest generalization about local CATV regulation is that it has been somewhat less than well-planned and
executed. In a limited number of areas CATVs are not supervised at all/ while in others regulation has taken the form of
simply auctioning off franchises. 6 Franchising has become the
most common form of control, and some cities, most particularly
New York, are making good use of it.
Despite some politically bitter disputes as to the city's failure to require competititive bidding in two cases,7 the uniform
not yet preempted the field. Id. at 464-65. It did not, however, offer any opinion as
to the extent of the FCC's power to preempt. Id. at 465. Although the FCC has
recently taken the position that it can totally preempt any local action, Notice of
Proposed Rule Making, Federal-State or Local Relationships, 35 Fed. Reg. 11,044
(1970) [hereinafter Federal-State Notice], it is uncertain that its power would be
held to e."(tend to matters of such seemingly local interest as rate regulation.
4 E.g., Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.s. 520 (1959); Morgan v.
Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946).
Ii Huntley & Phillips, Co=unity Antenna Television: A Regulatory Dile=a,
18 Ala. L. Rev. 64, 69 (1965).
6 Anthony, A Regulator Looks at State CATV Regulation, 82 Pub. Uti!. Fort.,
Dec. 5, 1968, 28, 29; Taylor, The Case for State Regulation of CATV Distribution
Systems, 23 Fed. Com. B.J. 110, 112 (1969).
7 Quite a furor developed over the Board of Estimate's proposal to grant two
Manhattan franchises to existing CATVs without competitive bidding. N.Y. Times,
July 24, 1970, at 63, col. 1; id., Mar. 29, 1970, at 60, col. 3. In an emotional editorial the Times was moved to denounce the lack of competitive bidding. N.Y.
Times, July 28, 1970, at 30, col. 2. The franchises were finally granted without
competitive bidding, although it will be required for franchises in other boroughs.
N.Y. Times, July 29, 1970, at 1, col. 2.
All of the political sound and fury was probably misdirected. Competitive
bidding seems to be a rather inappropriate means of awarding CATV franchises,
since the services rendered are less standardized than, for example, building contracts. A recent study of the question indicates that competitive bidding, whether
based on lump sum payments, percentages of gross receipts or required services, is
positively detrimental to the public interest. R. Posner, Cable Television: The Problem of Local Monopoly 14-20 (1970). Instead, Professor Posner suggests that cities
adopt a "bargaining" approach and attempt to deal with applicants for the best
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contract for all New York CATVs is notable for its comprehensive scope. It not only imposes detailed contractual terms
but also reserves a broad grant of future rulemaking power to
the city, 8 thereby avoiding any risk of the city's being locked
into a long-term obsolete contract. More importantly, the contract recognizes and provides for the development of CATV's
ability to connect individual households with other homes, commercial enterprises and cultural institutions. Thus the contract
requires an extremely large present channel capacity, an even
larger future one9 and the development of two-way CATV com"service-rate package"-with no resulting payoff to the city. Id. at 20. The proposal
seems sound in theory, but the means of implementing it are fraught with problems
too numerous to be discussed here.
Another peCUliarity of the New York City situation is that franchises are not
exclusive. New York City Proposed Form of Contract § 2(c) [hereinafter N.Y.C.
Contract]. This somewhat anomalous situation is produced not by the city's choice,
but rather by N.Y. Const. art. 3, § 17 which prohibits exclusive franchises. In
practicality, the nonexclusive nature of the franchise presents no real risk to the
contracting CATV. N.Y.C. Contract, supra § 3(c) requires that the contracting
CATV make service available to its whole franchise area within four years from the
granting of the franchise-thus giving it, as of that time, a de facto franchise. See
L. Johnson, The Future of Cable Television: Some Problems of Federal Regulation
64 (1970). Interestingly enough, Professor Posner takes the position that CATVs
should not get exclusive franchises on the grounds that some competition between
them is possible if potential subscribers are given a choice of different services.
Posner, supra at 8. This argument seems to overlook the fact-which Professor
Posner admits-that once one CATV is firmly entrenched in a community it becomes almost impossible for another CATV to move in. Id. at 10. Moreover, it also
assumes that all potential operators will offer their services simultaneously and that
subscribers will not be swayed by advertising.
8 N.Y.C. Contract, supra note 7, § 8(d).
9 Id. § 3(a) requires that a CATV immediately offer 17 channels and that it
increase its total capacity to 24 within three years from the granting of the franchise. Of the 17 channels immediately required, 11 are merely for local stations,
whose carriage has long since been required by the FCC. 47 C.F.R. § 74.1103 (1970).
The remaining channels are divided into four different categories. The one "company channel" is designed for origination by the CATV system. N.Y.C. Contract,
supra note 7, § l(p). The granting of only one channel for origination is the product
of two FCC rulings. The first requires a CATV to originate on one-but only onechannel. First Report and Order, 20 F.C.C.2d 201, 206 (1969). The second preempts local governments from any interference with such origination. Clarification
of CATV First Report As to Scope of Federal Pre-emption, 20 F.C.C.2d 741, 742
(1969). The two "city channels" are reserved for the use of the city. N.Y.C. Contract, supra note 7, § l(n). This provision is perhaps unfortunate since it seems
unrealistic to expect that the city will be able, at any time in the foreseeable future,
to originate enough programming to make real use of two channels, even on a
part-time basis. The provision for two "public channels," id. § 1(0), is perhaps the
most interesting of the four as it provides for common carrier access to the CATV.
Id. § 4(e). The fourth and final type of channel-the lIadditional channel"-calls
for an apparently modified form of common-carrier operation; non-CATV programmers must be given priority in access to it, but the CATV may use it when
there are no other customers available.Id. §§ l(q), 4(f).
One strange aspect of the contract concerns the order of allocation of channels
above the immediately required 17, i.e., one city channel, two public channels and
three additional channels. Id. § 4(c). This requirement makes it extremely difficult
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rilUnication}o. It also provides for CATV service for minority iri~
terests and small- geographical areas,l1 as well as the future
possible development of a CATV network through CATV interconnection.I2
Unfortunately, however, New York has been unable to resist
the temptation of treating CATV as an unexpected but needed
windfall of ready cash. 13 The city's demand for franchise fees of
5 per cent or more of gross receiptsI4 may be unwise both practically and legally. The effect of such fees could be to restrict CATV
operations, especially in light of the other obligations to be imposed on CATV by federal regulations and statutes now under
consideration.l[; Also the present fee arrangement is of questionable legality. First, and most significantly, the FCC has proposed
to limit municipal CATV franchise fees to Z per cent of gross receipts.HI Second, the Shth Circuit has recently held that a municifor a New York CATV to import the four distant independent signals which the
FCC is now proposing to allow. See text accompanying note 75 infra. In order to
import distant signals the CATV first would have to add the above total of sb: new
channels, then, petition the City's Director of Communications for still more
channels if there were enough non-CATV use of the four additional channels to
prevent carriage of all four distant signals on them. N.Y.C. Contract, supra note 7,
§ 22(c). This may be desirable in that it promotes the development of multichannel
capacity, but it may also unduly delay New York CATVs' use of distant signals.
10 rd. § 3(h). A CATV with such two-way capability would allow not only
the sending of signals into the home, but also a response to them-thus opening up
a panoply of new services.
11 rd. § 3(e) requires that a CATV divide its franchise area into at least ten
subdistricts, each capable of receiving its own specialized programming, within four
years from the granting of its franchise.
12 rd. § 3(d) requires a CATV to interconnect with any other CATV adjacent
to it. This is in accord with the FCC's present poliCY in favor of interconnection.
CATV Technical Standards, 35 Fed. Reg. 11,036, 11,037-38 (1970). Oddly enough,
in its negotiations with the broadcast industry the National Cable Television Association was willing, during at least one period, to accept a ban on interconnection
in exchange for limited use of distant signals. National Cable Television Ass'n Resolution § 5 (May 28, 1969) [hereinafter NCTA Resolution]. The pact was rejected
by the National Association of Broadcasters. National Ass'n of Broadcasters Resolution (June 20, 1969).
13 This practice is also co=on among other financially desperate city governments. See Federal-State Notice, supra note 3, at 11,045; Anthony, supra note 6,
at 30.
14 N.Y.C. Contract, supra note 7, § 7(a) requires that a CATV pay to the
City 5% of its gross receipts from all normal channel subscriptions, 10% of its
gross receipts from any other services and a percentage fixed by the Board of Estimate of its gross receipts from any pay channels.
15 See text accompanying notes 16, 81 infra. Or the city may, like the Commission and the Congress, be prepared to have subscribers ultimately assume the
cost. See text accompanying note 179 infra.
10 Federal-State Notice, supra note 3, at 11,045. See also National Ass'n of
Regulatory Uill. Co='rs, Model State CATV Regulatory Surveillance Act § 9
(1970) [hereinafter NARUC 1970] which provides for a similar, though unspecified, limit on franchise fees.

Imaged with the Permission of N. y.u. Law Review

820

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:816

pal gross receipts franchise fee violates the commerce clauseP
Although the court's rationale seems to be inadequate,18 it may
have some limited validity in the case of overlapping boundaries. 111
The New York regulatory experience presents a good example of another problem in local CATV regulation, i.e., obtaining jurisdiction over CATVs which operate by leasing telephone
company lines. Various cities have attempted to regulate such
CATVs, only to be judicially or administratively rebuffed. New
York suffered the most striking of these setbacks.
In City of New York 'lJ. Comtef,2o a lower state court construed some broad language in the New York City Charter21 to
deny the Board of Estimate the power to franchise enterprises
which used the streets but which did not make some form of
mystical "physical" or "tangible" contact with public property.22
The court further complicated the jurisdictional problem by indicating in dictum that because the telephone company had
amplified the signals before transmitting them over their lines,
the signals were telephone signals rather than those of the
CATV.23 This piece of judicial sorcery somehow survived review
by two appellate courts with the somewhat anomalous result that
17

Wonderland Ventures, Inc. v. City of Sandusky, 423 F.2d 548 (6th Cir.

1970).

18 The court based its decision on two grounds: (1) the franchise fee amounted
to an unconstitutional tax on the gross receipts of an interstate business, and (2)
the ordinances imposing the fee were too vague for the regulation of an area involving first amendment considerations. Both grounds seem questionable. The case
relied upon by the court in support of its first point, Fisher's Blend Station, Inc.
v. Tax Comm'n, 297 U.S. 650 (1936), is distinguishable since the tax there held
to violate the commerce clause was imposed on radio stations which broadcast to
numerous states and presumably derived some of their revenue from out-of-state
sources. Most CATVs, on the other hand, are local operations based solely within
one state or municipality. More in point is the recent case of Pacific Broadcasting
Corp. v. Riddell, 427 F.2d 519 (9th Cir. 1970), where the court upheld a Guam
privilege tax on the gross receipts of a radio station, apportioned to the amount
of advertising revenue obtained in Guam. The court's second point seems equally
weak. The Supreme Court has imposed strict vagueness requirements only where
regulation of expression is involved, not where merely financial hurdens are imposed
upon a means of expression. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
19 Where a CATV is subject to taxation by more than one state or local entity,
more than its total gross receipts might be taxed, thus creating a form of multiple
taxation probably violative of the co=erce clause. General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436 (1964).
20 57 Misc. 2d 585, 293 N.Y.S.2d 599 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd mem., 30 App. Div.
2d 1049, 294 N.Y.S.2d 981 (1st Dep't 1968), aff'd mem., 25 N.Y.2d 922, 252 N.E.2d
285, 304 N.Y.S.2d 853 (1969).
21 New York City, N.Y., Charter § 362 (1963) gives the Board of Estimate
"the exclusive power in behalf of the city to grant franchises ••• providing for or
involving the occupation or use of any of the streets."
22 57 Misc. 2d at 593, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 606.
23 Id. at 590-91, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 604.
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telephone-based CATV is not subject to city franchising while
all other CATVs are.24 Unfortunately, Comtel is not an isolated
aberration; at least one other state court and one other state administrative agency have arrived at similar results.25
Comtel-type rulings, however, do not create a total regulatory void; a telephone-based CATV can be indirectly regulated
through state and federal regulation of the telephone company.
Thus a state public service commission can control, to a limited
extent, a telephone-based CATV's rates and services by controlling the relevant telephone company tariff.26 On the federal level
the FCC has long been concerned with the relation between
telephone companies and telephone-based CATVs,27 and has exercised its indirect powers under the Communications Act of
193428 to require that telephone companies obtain certificates of
public convenience and necessity for CATV channel leasing.2!l
As will be discussed, the FCC's interest in the area culminated
most recently in a total ban on telephone company ownership
of telephone-based CATVs.30

B. State Regulation
Chairman Taylor of the Nevada Public Service Commission
recently warned his fellow state utility commissioners that unless
they moved into CATV regulation the FCC would preempt the
whole field. 31 Nevertheless, the FCC does not appear to be moving
24 The FCC has recently involved itself in the situation and has ordered
Com tel's franchised competitors not to e.... pand their systems, pending full CommL"Sion review of a hearing examiner's approval of the telephone company's leasing
channels to Com tel. See Memorandum Opinion and Order, No. 70-1094 (F.C.C.,
Oct. 7, 1970). The hearing e....aminer, while apparently not very impressed with New
York City's regulatory efforts, expre.o;sly took no position as to the validity or wisdom of them. In re Better T.V., Inc., No. 70-D-29, at 106 n.41 (F.C.C., July 20,
1970).
2G City of Waterville v. Bartell Tel. TV Systems, 233 A.2d 711 (Me. Sup. Ct.
1967); City of Jackson v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 63 P.U.R.3d 384 (Mich. Pub.
Servo Comm'n 1966).
26 In re New York Tel. Co., 34 P.U.R.3d 115 (N.Y. Pub. Servo Comm'n 1960).
See also In re Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 56 P.U.R.3d 419 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n
1964).
27 In In re American Tel. & Tel. Co., 7 P & F Radio Reg. 2d 179 (1966), the
FCC requested telephone companies to file tariffs for CATV channel leasing services.
It codified its request in Memorandum Opinion and Order, 7 P & F Radio Reg. 2d
673 (1966).
28 47 U.S.C. § 214 (1964).
29 See General Tel. Co., 13 P & F Radio Reg. 2d 667 (F.C.C. 1968), aff'd, 413
F.2d 390 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 888 (1969).
30 See te.n accompanying notes 139-42 infra.
31 Taylor, supra note 6, at 112-15 (1969). In a slightly conspiratorial tone,
Chairman Taylor warned his colleagues that "certain staff members" of the FCC
were responsible for planning the move. Id at 113.
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in this direction,s2 and most states have not heeded Chairman
Taylor's admonition. At present only five states regulate CATV
to any significant extent.
Wyoming, the first state to do so, proceeded by perhaps the
easiest method: its Public Service Commission simply declared
CATV to be a public utility and thus within its jurisdiction.s8
The California Public Utility Commission attempted to follow
the same course, only to be reversed by the Supreme Court of
California.84 The four other states now regulating CATV took
the more orthodox and somewhat better-planned approach of
placing CATV within their general scheme of public utility regulation by statutory enactment.85 In addition to requiring that
CATVs obtain a certificate of public convenience and necessity,86
these statutes establish at least the semantic basis for rate regulation by classifying CATV as a public utility.87 They differ,
however, in two significant respects.
First, the scope of the powers granted to each state's public
service commission varies. Nevada, the only state to adopt the
Model CATV Act,38 broadly authorizes its commission to make
any regulations which it deems "necessary or convenient.l139 On
32 See text accompanying notes 54-60 infra.
33 In re Cokeville Radio & Electronic Co., 6 P.U.R.3d

129, 133-35 (Wyo. Pub.
Servo Comm'n 1954). The Wyoming Commission reaffirmed its position several
times. In re Community Television Sys. of Wyoming, 23 P.U.R.3d 444 (Wyo. Pub.
Servo Comm'n 1958) i In re Rawlins Community Television Co., 12 P.U.R.3d 208
(Wyo. Pub. Servo Comm'n 1956). More recently, the Attorney General of Hawaii
rendered an opinion that CATV was a public utility. Opinion Att'y Gen. of Hawaii,
1969 Uti!. L. Rep. U 21,206. No action, however, appears to have been taken to
implement the ruling. But see In re Seneca Radio Corp., 57 P.U.R.3d 67 (Ohio
Pub. Uti!. Comm'n 1964) i In re Edwin Frances Bennett, 89 P.U.R. (n.s.) 149
(Wis. Pub. Servo Comm'n 1951) (state commissions denying jurisdiction over
CATV). Cf. Staminski V. Romeo, 310 N.Y.S.2d 169 (Sup. Ct. 1970); Aberdeen
Cable T.V. Serv., Inc. v. City of Aberdeen, No. 10731-r-CSH (S.D. Sup. Ct., May
5, 1970) (CATVs held to be public utilities in nonregulatory context).
34 Television Transmission, Inc. V. Public Uti!. Comm'n, 47 Cal. 2d 82, 301
P.2d 862 (1956), where the court held it to be ultra vires.
35 See Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. §§ 16-330 to -333 (1966) i Nev. Rev. Stat.
§§ 711.010 to .180 (1969); Rl. Gen. Laws Ann. §§ 39-19-1 to -8 (Supp. 1969);
Vt. Stat. Ann., tit. 30, §§ 501-07 (Supp. 1970).
36 Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. § 16-331 (1966) i Nev. Rev. Stat. § 711.090 (1969);
R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 39-19-3 (Supp. 1969); Vt. Stat. Ann., tit. 30, § S03(a)
(Supp. 1970) (a license required in addition to a certificate).
37 Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. § 16-1 (1966) ("public service company"); Nev.
Rev. Stat. § 74.020(1) (a) (1969) ("pUblic utility") i Rl. Gen. Laws Ann. § 39-1-2
(Supp. 1969) ("public utility") i Vermont does so indirectly, since under Vt. Stat.
Ann., tit. 30, § 201 (Supp. 1970) any company subject to the Public Service Board's
jurisdiction is considered a "public service" company.
38 National Ass'n of Regulatory Uti!. Comm'rs, Model State Community
Antenna Television System Act (1966) [hereinafter NARUC 1966].
39 Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 711.090, .140 (1969).
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the other hand, Rhode Island seems to narrowly limit its commission to the power of placing conditions on certificates before
issuance.4o In between, Vermont merely expands its commission's
traditional regulatory powers to include CATV41 while Connecticut allows the commission to create new conditions on certificates
after they have been issued if the "public interest" requires.42
The differences in powers, however, may be academic; since each
statute defines CATV as a public utility, each state agency may
be authorized to exercise the broad powers granted by its general
enabling statute.
Second, the four acts differ in their approach to the issue of
rate regulation. Only the Nevada statute explicitly gives its commission the power to set rates;43 the Connecticut and Vermont
statutes are totally silent on the subject; and the Rhode Island
statute prohibits discriminatory rates44 but does not explicitly
give its commission any power to make rates. Once again, however, the lack of an express grant of power may not be determinative; all three commissions have a general authority to regulate
public utility rates which presumably extends to CATVs by nature
of their definition as such.45
Rate regulation has been one of the most sensitive issues in
both local and state CATV regulation. The CATV industry has
40 The Rhode Island statute clearly gives the commission the authority to
impose conditions in certificates. R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 39-19-4 (Supp. 1969). It
is, however, unclear as to the breadth of the commission's authority. One section
of the act appears to limit the commL<sion's power to regulating a CATV's physical
structures. Id. § 39-19-2. Another seems to define the commission's jurisdiction in
somewhat broader, though by no means expansive, terms as including "reasonable
rules and regulations" in relation to the operation-though not the programmingof CATVs. Id. § 39-19-6.
41 The Vermont statute's grant of power is made by the very simple means
of incorporating by reference the general powers of the Public Service Board. Vt.
Stat. Ann., tit. 30, § 504 (Supp. 1970). These powers include a broad grant of
general regulatory authority, ratemaking power and control over service. Id. §§ 209,
213-19.
42 Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. § 16-331 (1966) empowers the commission to "specify
in the certificate at the time of issue and from time to time thereafter such terms
as the public interest may require." (emphasis added).
43 Nev. Rev. Stat. § 711.150(3) (1969).
44 R.Io Gen. Laws Ann. § 39-19-6 (Supp.1969).
4G See Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. § 16-19 (1966); R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 39-3-10 to -11
(Supp. 1969); Vt. Stat. Ann., tit. 30, § 213 (1970). Rhode Island, it should be
noted, has a provision which is strange but not totally out of character for the
state which spawned the moraIs policing system struck down in Bantam Books,
Inc., v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 53 (1963). R.I. Gen. Laws § 39-19-3 (Supp. 1969) empowers the commission to revoke the certificate of any CATV system "whose programs originating within this State are offensive to commonly accepted standards
of morality and decency of the community."
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had a traditional fear of rate regulation,46 and there appears to
be a certain squeamishness on the part of some states to impose
it4'1'-perhaps due to the belief that CATV lacks sufficient public
utility characteristics to constitutionally support such regulation.48
The proposition, however, seems doubtful. Most CATVs usually
have an exclusive franchise and thus fall within any classical
definition of a public utility. Moreover, even if a CATV does not
have an exclusive franchise, it certainly seems to meet the Supreme
Court's exceedingly liberal test of a business "affected with a
public interest.,,49
The real problem with CATV rate regulation seems to be
not its validity but rather its standards. The use of traditional
valuation methods creates a risk of setting the rate base either too
high or too low. Since CATV involves a large initial investment
with small immediate return, a newly constructed CATV may
require setting an artificially low rate base. 50 On the other hand,
if the CATV is well-established and has been depreciated over a
46

Note, The Wire Mire: The FCC and CATV, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 366, 373

(1965).

4'1' Taylor, supra note 6, at 117. It is noteworthy that an alternative to the
position taken in NARUC 1966, supra note 38, § 9 has now been proposed. Sec
NARUC 1970, supra note 16, § 10 which, like the Rhode Island statute, provides
only that rates must not be discriminatory.
48 At least one co=entator has argued that CATV should not be considered
a public utility on the grounds that it is not a "necessity" and that it competes
with broadcast television. Shafer, Cable Television: Is State Regulation Needed? I
84 Pub. Uti!. Fort., July 3, 1969, at 23, 25-26. This overlooks the fact that a CATV
has a monopoly as to a particular form of service different from broadcast television.
The same author also rests his argument on the somewhat naive proposition that
price and service abuses by CATVs are of minor importance, since CATV abuses
are not yet widespread. Id. at 26-28.
49 The traditional test of "affected with a public interest" originates, of
course, with Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877). It should be remembered, however, that the businesses involved in that case held no form of exclusive franchise
but rather were, at least theoretically, in competition with each other. A CATV
on the other hand, has a de facto monopoly simply because of the prohibitive costs
of laying cable. Johnson, supra note 7, at 64. Moreover, it appears that in some
subdivisions the developer will contract for CATV service and, at the same time,
prohibit use of rooftop antennas-thus making CATV SUbscription an absolute
necessity. Witt, CATV and Local Regulation,S Cal. West. L. Rev. 30, 39 (1968).
Finally, the Court has been increasingly liberal in its definition of "affected." In
Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236 (1941), the Court announced a "drift away" from
its older, more stringent standards and held the state could regulate an employment
agency-a business certainly having far less exclusive control over the public than
a CATV. Id. at 245-46.
50 At least one state commission has recognized this problem. In In re Rawlins
Co=unity Antenna Television Co., 12 P.U.R.3d 214, 216-17 (Wyo. Pub. Servo
Comm'n 1956), the commission allowed a CATV to charge higher initial installation
charges-returnable at a future date-in order to finance the initial cost of constructing the system. Accord, In re Robert M. Carollo, 13 P.U.R.3d 581 (Wyo. Pub.
Servo Comm'n 1956).
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substantial period of time, a higher base would be appropriate.lil
Thus, rates must be based upon a flexible formula that correlates
the high cost of constructing a CATV with the comparatively
low cost of operating it.
Thus, local and state regulation of CATV is presently in a
state of flu.... and confusion. Unfortunately, the governmental
entities involved have made no effort to work out a sophisticated,
uniform set of regulatory standards. And, despite Chairman
Taylor's predictions,u2 no solution seems to be forthcoming from
the federal level.
The efforts of Congress to regulate CATV have been principally concerned with compulsory copyright licensing and have
had virtually no effect on state and local regulation. 53 Moreover,
the FCC has not attempted to coordinate federal, state and local
CATV regulation; it candidly admits that it has not had any
"overall plan"u4 and that it does not presently have the ability to
implement one.5u The FCC, however, is considering indirect supervision of matters now regulated solely by local or state governments. One approach in its newly proposed CATV regulations
would require local governments to certify to the FCC that they
had considered various criteria in granting a franchise. 56 This
type of approach not only is consistent with the FCC's desire for
extensive local CATV regulation,07 but also seems to be the only
pragmatic alternative. The FCC has sufficient trouble with its nondelegable regulation of 7500 radio and television stations that it
seems quixotic to expect it to supervise in detail several thousand
more enterprises.us Moreover, there are many details of CATV
operation which simply cannot be handled on any other than a
10callevel.1i9 It therefore seems likely that local and state govern01 Taylor, supra note 6, at 118. Moreover, CATV depreciation rates are still
far from standardized and reliable. Posner, supra note 7, at 28.
u2 See text accompanying note 31 supra.
u3 See Section III infra.
I:i4 Federal-State Notice, supra note 3, at 11,044.
r;fj Memorandum Opinion and Order, 35 Fed. Reg. 10,901-02 (1970).
GO Federal-State Notice, supra note 3, at 11,045. The Commission posed three
alternative modes of regulation: totally federal, the present intermi'<:ed type and
the certification proposal. The first was obviously meant to be somewhat rhetorical
as the Commission by way of understatement noted that "for this approach to be
effective, considerable resources would have to be made available to this agency."
Id. at 11,044.
07 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Notice of Inquiry, 33 Fed. Reg. 19,028,
19,031 (1968).
oS See Broadcasting in America and the F.C.C.'s License Renewal Process:
An Oklahoma Case Study, 14 F.C.C.2d 1 (1968) (Johnson & Cox, Comm'rs, dissenting).
till For example, New York City requires its CATVs to provide minimum
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ments will continue to exercise most of their present regulatory
powers.60 While they may operate subject to a slightly baleful
FCC eye, it seems unlikely that the FCC will be willing or able
to exert much more than a moral influence in the near future.

II
FCC REGULATION
When the Commission was initially confronted with the
problem of CATV in 1959, its first reaction was simply to hide
its head in the sand by denying that it had any jurisdiction over
CATV at all. 61 During the next seven years, however, CATV refused to disappear or even to become the "auxiliary" communications system which the Commission considered it.62 It not only
grew in a manner which the Commission later termed "explosive,"63 but also began to make increasing use of programs from
television stations outside its service area-so-called "distant
signals."64 This latter phenomenon disturbed the broadcast industry since a CATV's offering of attractive and otherwise unavailable programs presumably results in a fragmentation of a
local station's audience. As a result, the Commission was finally
moved to action65 and in 1965 decided that it did, after all, have
jurisdiction66 and promulgated a set of regulations which amounted
to a total freeze on all CATV use of distant signals,67 presumably
liability insurance, a security fund and equal opportunity employment. N.Y.C.
Contract, supra note 7, §§ 12-14.
60 It is not clear how the proposed certification provision would apply to
those states which presently regulate CATV. The Commission certainly seems to
be thinking in terms of regulation by cities, rather than by states. At the same
time, it is highly unlikely that the FCC would preempt the jurisdiction of the
states. Federal-State Notice, supra note 3, at 11,045.
61 Report and Order, 26 F.C.C. 403, 427-31 (1959).
62 First Report and Order, 38 F.C.C. 683, 698-99 (1965).
63 Second Report and Order, 2 F.C.C.2d 725, 738 (1966).
64 A distant signal is defined in terms somewhat opposite of what might be
expected, i.e., by the area from which it is taken, rather than by the area into
which it is imported. Thus, 47 C.F.R. § 74.1101(i) (1970) defines a distant signal
as the signal of a station which does not broadcast a Grade B contour over the
CATV's co=unity. The coverage of a television station's signal is measured by
three main standards of increasing coverage and decreasing signal quality-Principal
Co=unity contour, Grade A contour and Grade B contour. Id. §§ 73.683(a)
to .685(a).
65 It is perhaps unfair to suggest, as one Commissioner recently did, that the
Commission has been "captured by the broadcast industry." N. Johnson, How To
Talk Back To Your Television Set 201 (1970). The Commission, however, has
been heavily committed to the development and perpetuation of broadcast television ever since it issued its first scheme of allocations in 1952. Sixth Report and
Order, 17 Fed. Reg. 3905 (1952).
66 First Report and Order, 38 F.C.C. 683, 685 (1965).
67 47 C.F.R. §§ 74.1101 to .1111 (1970); Second Report and Order, 2 F.C.C.2d

Imaged with the Permission of N. y.u. Law Review

October 1970]

CATV REGULATION

827

hoping that either Congress or the Supreme Court would resolve
the underlying question of CATV copyright liability. When
neither did,6s it attempted to do so itself by proposing a new set
of rules under which major market CATVs69 would be allowed
to import distant signals only after securing the "express authorization" of the station originating the distant signaI.7° To further
complicate matters, the Commission allegedly left the 1966 rules
in effect but at the same time laid down so-called "interim procedures"71 which provided that future applications to carry distant signals would be handled in accordance with the proposed
rules. The decisiveness of the Commission's action is reflected in
the fact that the proposed rules have not yet been promulgated
and the interim procedures are still in effect.
The Commission's newly proposed regulations must be viewed
against this confused background. In June 1970 the Commission
disgorged a variety of documents-opinions, orders, reports,
notices of rulemaking and notices of inquiry-which changed its
direction once again and set out a radically new course for CATV
regulation. 72 As with its past reversals, the Commission's reasons
725 (1966). The freeze resulted in two ways. First, a lengthy evidentiary hearing
was required before a CATV could import a distant signal into a major market.
47 C.F.R. § 74.1107 (1970). (Only one such proceeding has ever been completed.)
Second, the combination of two other rules resulted in the imposition of a virtually
identical requirement for markets below the top 100. Id. § 74.1105 requires that
a CATV give notice to local television stations before importing distant signals.
It further provides that if a petition opposing the planned importation is filed
under id. § 74.1109 within 30 days of the notice, the CATV may not begin service
until the Commission has decided the proceeding. The Supreme Court recently declined to review a decision upholding the validity of the automatic stay provision.
Bucks County Cable TV, Inc., v. United States, 427 F.2d 438 (3d Cir.) , cert.
denied, 39 U.S.L.W. 3147 (U.S. Oct. 12, 1970) (No. 443). As a practical matter,
a petition will quickly follow the filing of a notice. See Memorandum and Order,
6 F.C.C.2d 309, 339 (1967) (Loevinger, Comm'r, dissenting).
6S Congress failed to act and the Supreme Court held that CATV was not
subject to copyright liability. Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc.,
392 U.S. 390 (1968).
O!} 47 C.F.R. § 74.1107(a) (1970) defines major market CATVs as those in
the 100 largest television markets according to the market ratings of the American
Research Bureau, a private organization. The 1968 proposed rules substitute for
this a list of markets and thus rule out the risk that a CATV's position might
change from week to week. 1968 Proposed F.C.C. Rule, 47 C.F.R. § 74.1107(a)
(1970). The most recent proposal suggests following the 1968 standards, but leaves
the issue open for comment. Second Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making,
35 Fed. Reg. 11,045, 11,046 n.6 (1970).
70 1968 Proposed F.C.C. Rule, 47 C.F.R. § 74.1107(b) (1970).
71 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Notice of Inquiry, 15 F.C.C.2d 417,
437-39 (1968).
72 Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 35 Fed. Reg. 11,045 (1970)
[hereinafter Public Dividend Notice]; Federal-State Notice, supra note 3; Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking and of Inquiry, 35 Fed. Reg. 11,042 (1970) [hereinaiter
Multiple Ownership Notice]; Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 35 Fed. Reg. 11,040
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and motivations are not entirely clear and may range from a
change of personneF3 to a decreasing belief in the danger of importing distant signals.74 In any event, these newly proposed regulations represent the Commission's most creative attempt to resolve the CATV problem. The new policy basically tries to
protect television stations from audience fragmentation by CATV
while, at the same time, developing CATV's full capabilities.

A. Protection of Television
1. Public Dividend Plan.
The first aspect of this new approach is embodied in the
precedent-breaking proposal that CATVs be allowed to import
distant signals within certain limitations. Although the proposal,
which has not yet been drafted as a definite proposed rule, is
billed as an "alternative" to the 1968 proposed regulations, it
seems intended to supersede the de facto rule status of the interim
procedures.75 Moreover, the Commission seems to be committed
to adopting the proposal with somewhat less than its usual delay.76
(1970) [hereinafter Sports Delay Notice]; Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, .35
Fed. Reg. 11,036 (1970) [hereinafter Technical Notice]; Second Report and Order,
35 Fed. Reg. 10,903 (1970) [hereinafter Crossownership Order J; Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 35 Fed. Reg. 10,901 (1970) [hereinafter Origination Order].
73 Cf. First Report and Order, 38 F.C.C. 683, 758 (1965) (Loevinger, Comm'r,
dissenting): "The only thing that has changed since the Commission last disclaimed
the jurisdiction it now asserts is the personnel of the Commission." See also LeDuc,
The FCC v. CATV et al.: A Theory of Regulatory Reflex Action, 23 Fed. Com.
B.J. 93 (1969), for the proposition that the Commission's initial resistance to
CATV was the product of bureaucratically entrenched staff members' dislike of
change.
74 Johnson, supra note 7, at 20-26, suggests that importation of distant signals does not injure local television stations at all. His theory, however, is based on
the assumption that the local television station's signal will also be imported into
another CATV's area, thus increasing the local station's viewers in the distant area.
Even assuming that advertisers are willing to pay for such distant viewers, Professor Johnson's theory is accurate only in the unlikely e\"ent of two relevant
CATV's importing equally and having the same audience with the SlIlle viewing
habits. It seems doubtful that the audience which a New York City independent
television station would lose by CATV importation of a Philadelphia signal would
be equaled by a Philadelphia CATV's importation of the New York City television
station's signal. At least some members of the Commission's staff, however, now
seem to agree with Professor J ohnson-even in situations not balanced like the
one which he creates. A recent staff report took the position that importation of
distant independent signals into major markets would cause little audience fra!(mentation. FCC, staff report prepared by Broadcast Bureau Research Branch, The
Economics of the TV-CATV Interface 16-22 (1970) [hereinafter Staff Report].
75 Public Dividend Notice, supra note 72, at 11,045. That the Commission
does intend to supersede the 1968 proposed regulations is further indicated by its
disavowal of any power to impose copyright liability-a result which the retransmission consent requirement of the earlier proposal attempted to reach. Id. at 11,047.
76 The Commission warned interested parties to "not follow what has all
too often been the practice in these complex rulemaking proceedings-doing nothing
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The heart of this so-called "public dividend plan"7'1' is the
provision that a major market CATV may carry four independent distant signals in addition to all its local and network signals
if it deletes the commercials from the distant signals and offers
the resulting time to local television stations for substitution of
their own commercials.'I's The time is allocated by simply giving
each local television station a distant signal on which to substitute
its commercials. Each local television station is given its choice
of the distant signals, subject to a priority system which gives
first choice to UHF stations.'I'O Where the stations cannot, subject
to the priority system, agree upon distribution of the distant
signals, the order of choice is rotated among the stations on an
annual basis.80 The final provision of the proposal requires
CATVs to pay 5 per cent of their gross revenues through some
unspecified medium to educational television (ETV) .81
On its face, the public dividend plan seems the most imaginative method of resolving the distant signal problem, since it
allows CATVs to import distant signals but compensates local
television stations for resulting audience fragmentation. The
plan, however, does raise some rather weighty problems of both
policy and practicality.
a. Policy Considerations. On a policy level the plan introduces several new factors into the relationship between different
classes of television stations. First, its decision to give priority in
choice of distant signals-and thus presumably the most attractive distant signals-to UHF stations amounts to a subsidy of
UHF at the expense of VHF. This is compounded by the fact
that VHFs generally have larger audiences than UHFs and thus
for several months and then seeking extensions when the third month deadline
looms upon them!' Id. at 11,049.
77 Broadcasting, June 15, 1970, at 17.
78 Public Dividend Notice, supra note 72, at 11,046. The basic concept of the
plan is remarkably similar to a proposal formulated by two commentators. Chazen
& Ross, Federal Regulation of Cable Television: The Visible Hand, 83 Harv. L.
Rev. 1820 (1970). The rommentators differ from the Commission, however, in that
they would use the techniques of commercial substitution and subsidization to
different ends; the proceeds from the former would go to copyright owners, while
the subsidy payments would go to local ultra high frequency (UHF) stations. Id.
at 1839. The similarity between the two plans may not be so surprising, in light
of the commentators' partially crediting their plan to a recent filing with the Commission. Id. at 1836 n.56.
'1'0 Public Dividend Notice, supra note 72, at 11,046. The order of priority is:
first, to any independent UHF station in an intermh:ed market, then to any network
UHF station in an intenni...ed market, then to all stations in an all very high
frequency (VHF) or all UHF markets after a two year waiting period, and finally
to any station able to show itself substantially injured by a CATV. '
80 Id. at 11,046 n.10.
81 Id. at 11,046-47.
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will have larger CATV audience losses. Therefore, this priority
system causes the station with the smallest audience loss to get
the most attractive distant signal. While this seems to treat VHFs
unfairly, it has a sound basis. The Commission has made a substantial commitment to UHF development82 and appears to feel
that VHFs are now profitable enough to withstand the burden
imposed by the plan, while UHFs need the subsidy the plan gives
them. 83 Moreover, since CATV may increase both the total
amount of television viewing84 and the total viewing audience,85
CATV development may result in more viewers, and consequently
more advertising revenue, for all stations.
Second, the plan would also affect ETV growth by allowing
a CATV to import any number of distant ETV signals.86 Although
this follows the Commission's 1968 proposed rules,87 it seems inconsistent with the Commission's past encouragement of ETV8 8
and, more particularly, with the public dividend plan's emphasis
on funding ETV. The Commission may, however, no longer fear
that importation of distant ETV signals will decrease local motivation to support an ETV. Also it may feel that the plan's "public
dividend" will make ETV viable, despite competition with distant
ETV signals. This seems to be a sensible tradeoff since the extent
to which importation of distant ETV signals actually affects local
ETVs has never been adequately established.
Third, and perhaps most important, the plan does not make
any meaningful correlation between CATV-related audience loss
and CATV-related audience gain via commercial substitution. For
example, in a market with two stations and CATV, station A may
lose only one-third the number of viewers that station Bioses
to CATV. Assuming that neither station has priority of choice,
under the rotation method station A will be able to have the most
attractive distant signal for at least one year, even though its
82 Notice of Inquiry and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 1 F.C.C.2d 453,
469-70 (1965).
83 Public Dividend Notice, supra note 72, at 11,046-47. A recent Commission
staff report took exactly this position in balancing off the relatively small loss to
major market VHFs against their currently large profits. Staff Report, supra note
74, at 16.
84 Fisher & Ferrall, Community Antenna Television Systems and Local Television Station Audience, 80 Q.J. Econ. 227, 248 (1966). The Commission's staff,
however, has decided that it would not. Staff Report, supra note 74, at 11-15.
85 First Report and Order, 20 F.C.C.2d 201, 203 n.l (1969); Johnson, supra
note 7, at 25.
86 The only protection given an ETV would be to insert its own appeals for
funds in distant signals and, as in the past, to file a petition protesting the proposed
importation. Public Dividend Notice, supra note 72, at 11,046.
87 1968 Proposed FCC Rule, 47 C.F.R. §§ 74.1107(b), (d)(4)-(5), (e) (1970).
88 Second Report and Order, 2 F.C.C.2d 725, 761-63 (1966).
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audience loss is so much smaller than station B's. Moreover, the
plan's provision for rotation of distant signal choice would not
correct the imbalance; over a period of time this would result
only in parity between the two stations in commercial substitution
time, with station B still losing three times as many viewers as
station A. Furthermore, an even greater risk of imbalance is
created where one station has priority of choice. A UHF might,
because of its comparatively small audience, suffer a small CATV
audience loss and yet consistently pick the most attractive distant
signa1.89 The real problem with the plan is that it assigns distant
signals as units; instead, it should assign the number of distant
signal viewers equal to the number of viewers lost by the local
station. This latter type of equalization is, of course, much more
complicated than the former, since it requires measuring each
station's audience loss and each distant signal's audience gaina task probably beyond current survey techniques. Nevertheless,
such a system is necessary to prevent gross imbalances.
Finally, the imposition of the ETV payment raises some
problems, even assuming that the 5 per cent figure is as reasonable as any other and that the Commission is capable of finding
an appropriate body to administer the proceeds. It seems strange
to single out CATV as the sole contributor to the fund. 90 The
Commission justifies the payments on the grounds that the
CATV's importation of distant signals is a use of the television
system which benefits the CATV.9! This approach is questionable since it seems that CATVs will probably be subject to some
form of copyright liability in the near future. 92 Moreover, the
fiat 5 per cent figure is unfair to the CATV which imports less
than the full four signals for which it is presumably paying.93
Finally, there may be some question as to the Commission's power
to impose the payments. Although the Commission's authority to
89 This seems especially strange since mere carriage on a CATV decreases a
UHF's inherent problems; i.e., tuner disadvantages and weak signal strength are
avoided by CATV carriage of UHF and VHF stations on the same tuner. Staff
Report, supra note 74, at 11.
00 It seems only just that a national policy of subsidization be funded by the
National Government. To this end congressional approval of substantial funding
of the Corporation for Public Broadcasting seems to be in the offing. See Broadcasting, Sept. 21, 1970, at 3S.
91 Public Dividend Notice, supra note 72, at 11,046.
02 See te.u accompanying notes 152-59 infra.
D3 This would not be a co=on situation since it is obviously in the CATV's
best interests to offer as many signals as possible in order to attract subscribers. It
might, however, be somewhat of a problem for older systems which lack channel
capacity to carry aU four distant signals in addition to the local stations and the
required origination channeL
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regulate CATV's importation of distant signals seems clear,9' its
ability to condition importation on monetary considerations is
less certain. If the "public dividend" were held to be in the nature
of a tax, it might be either ultra vires or even a violation of the
revenue-raising provisions in the Constitution.lllS
b. Practical Problems. On the practical level other problems
are apparent. First, there might be, and certainly would have
been under one past Senate bill, conflict between the distant
signal provisions and CATV copyright legislation.u6 The most
recent bill would have posed no such obstacle. Although it limited
the number of signals for which a CATV has a compulsory license,97 it also gave the Commission power to increase that number.98
Second, practical difficulties arise from the plan's allocation
of distant signals among local stations. The plan recognizes but
does not resolve the difficulty created when a CATV imports
fewer distant signals than there are local stations.99 This situation
could result either from the CATV's importing less than the full
four signals, a rare occurrence, or simply from a market's having
more than four commercial stations. IOO Moreover, the converse
of this problem would exist in markets having less than four
stations.101 This latter situation would present the Scylla and
Charybdis problem of either overcompensating a local television
station by giving it more than one distant signal or allowing some
distant signals to retain their own advertisements. Some formula
of signal allocation to cover both these situations is obviously
needed.
Third, the plan does not make any provision for the classic
"footnote 69" problem,l°2 i.e., the situation in which a CATV is
94 This would certainly seem to fall within the Supreme Court's grant to the
Commission of all powers over CATV "reasonably ancillary" to the Commission's
other powers, since importation of distant signals is such a central part of the
CATV problem. United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157,178 (1968).
95 U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, d. 1, provides: "All Bills for raising Revenue shall
originate in the House of Representatives ...."
96 See text accompanying notes 161-64 infra.
97 S. 543, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 111(c) (2) (1969). Although the bill is technically pending, its passage is unlikely. Senator McClellan announced in August
1970 that the Senate Co=ittee on the Judiciary's failure to report out the bill
made further action on it during that session impossible. 116 Congo Rec. 13,546
(daily ed. Aug. 17, 1970).
98 S. 543, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 111 (d) (3) (1969).
99 Public Dividend Notice, supra note 72, at 11,046 n.lO.
100 See Staff Report, supra note 74, at 7-9 for a breakdown of the number of
stations in the major television markets.
101
102

Id.

Second Report and Order, 2 F.C.C.2d 725,786 n.69 (1966).
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located within two overlapping major markets. Under the plan,
such a CATV presumably could carry "local" signals from both
markets103 in addition to the four distant signals permitted. The
Commission might easily resolve the issue by adopting a provision
similar to one of its 1968 proposed regulations, which allowed a
CATV to carry signals from both markets only if its community
were wholly within range of both markets.104
Fourth, the plan would retain the nonduplication rule105
which prohibits a CATV from showing a distant signal program
within twenty-four hours of its broadcast on local television.l06
This continued protection is inconsistent with the basic thrust of
the plan. It seems unnecessary to guarantee a local station nonduplication protection when any CATV audience loss presumably
will be made up by commercial substitution.
Finally, the plan is unclear as to how the switching equipment for commercial substitution will be financed and operated.
The Commission proposes that the local station assume the expenses.101 \Vhile this is sensible in light of CATV's many other
financial burdens/OS it seems strange to require a station to pay
for what is in theory only the restoration of its rightful audience.
A more reasonable approach might require the CATV to bear the
full cost-with an appropriate reduction in its proposed ETV
payments-or to share the cost with the local station as suggested
by the Commission.109

2. Anti-siphoning Provisions.
Subject to a few modifications the public dividend plan is a
workable means of finally resolving the distant signal quandary.
CATVs do more, however, than just carry television stations'
signals; they are able, and are encouraged by the Commission,
to originate their own programmingYo Consequently, the Commission is also concerned about CATVs using their economically
stronger base of pay channels to outbid television stations for
attractive programming. As a result, the Commission has now
imposed on CATV pay channels1l1 the same "anti-siphoning"
Public Dividend Notice, supra note 72, at 11,046.
1968 Proposed FCC Rule, 47 C.F.R. § 74.1107(c) (1970).
Public Dividend Notice, supra note 72, at 11,047.
47 C.F.R. §§ 74.1103(e)-(g) (1970).
Public Dividend Notice, supra note 72, at 11,047.
See text accompanying notes 16, 81 supra.
Public Dividend Notice, supra note 72, at 11,047.
See note 123 infra.
111 47 C.F.R. § 74.1121 (1970).

103
104
105
106
107
lOS
109
110
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provisions regarding movies,112 sports events 113 and conventional
television serial-type programsl14 to which STV is currently subject.l1I; At the same time, however, the Commission's decision to
allow CATVs to operate pay channels is a bold one and a reversal
of prior policy.116 Disregarding the sound and fury which broadcasters and theater owners inevitably raise, a per-program charge
for television entertainment may be the most sensible way of
financing high-quality and minority-oriented programming. Pay
television, whether via CATV or STV, makes the production of
programs for limited audiences economically feasible; advertisersupported, supposedly "free" television, must of necessity attempt to appeal to the widest possible audience-with the public
ultimately paying the price through the increased cost of advertised goods,u7 There is, of course, always the possibility, recognized by the Commission, that pay television will ultimately
produce the same low-quality programming that advertisersupported television currently offers; 118 however, this is merely
a factor to be taken into account in the future, rather than a
reason for banning pay television entirely.
The Commission's mechanical application of the STV antisiphoning rules to CATV, however, does raise some policy
questions. CATV may have a stronger economic base than television stations because of subscription fees as well as per-program
charges. Thus there is substance in the Commission's fears that
112 Id. § 74.1121 (a) (1) prohibits the showing of films which "have had general release in theaters anywhere in the United States more than two years prior to
their cablecast." It does, however, allow a CATV to show during one week per
month a film more than ten years old.
113 Id. § 74.112I(a) (2) prohibits the showing of sports events which have been
broadcast over a local station within two years; Sports Delay Notice, supra note 72,
at 11,041 proposes to extend the time limit to five years. This lengthening of the
ban, though perhaps politically wise, may actually tum the tables and be unfair to
CATV and subscription television (STV) in bidding against television stations.
First, the theory behind the inadequacy of the two-year period is questionable;
in order for the owner of the sports event rights to reap a "bonanza" by withholding from television stations for one year, id. at 11,041, he would have to be
assured that CATV or STV would be willing to outbid television stations by at
least 50% per year during the next two years in order to even make good his loss.
Moreover, the proposed five-year rule will allow a television station to cut CATV
or STV off from any given programming by simply outbidding them once every
five years. Thus a television station could outbid CATV or STV by 25% in any
given year, and spread the cost over five years-thus making its actual cost only
5% per year.
114 47 C.F.R. § 74.112I(a)(3) (1970).
115 Id. § 73.643(b).
116 See Second Report and Order, 2 F.C.C.2d 725,787 (1966).
117 Fourth Report and Order, 14 P & F Radio Reg. 2d 1601, 1688 n.51 (1968);
Coase, The Economies of Broadcasting and Government Policy, 56 Am. Econ.
Papers & Proceedings 440, 446 (1966).
118 See Fourth Report and Order, 14 P & F Radio Reg. 2d 1601, 1625 (1968)
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CATV could "hide" extra costs in subscription rates and not
need per-program charges to outbid television stations.l19 On the
other hand, the strict STV anti-siphoning regulations may be
inappropriate for CATV since it, unlike STV, is subject to local
rate regulation.12o Finally, the Commission's imposition of identical restrictions on the two media may throw them into the same
competitive field-a situation the Commission apparently disfavored in the past.121 Since CATV is much more firmly established than STV, this might result in the stillbirth of STV.
Thus, through the public dividend plan and the anti-siphoning provisions, the Commission has been able to work out a
basically viable means of protecting television and yet not unduly
inhibiting CATV growth. At the same time the Commission has
made its most affirmative commitment yet to the full development
of CATV.
B. Development of CATV
In shaping CATV's future, the Commission's principal concern is with insuring its development into a multi-channel medium
that is capable of making available its own programming, channels for independent producers and two-way communications.122
The Commission's most decisive step in this direction is its requirement that CATVs originate their own programming "to a
significant extent.m23 While the effective date of the requirement
has been delayed until April 1, 1971/24 and while the requirement
will initially be applied only to CATVs with more than 3500 subscribers/2li the Commission seems firmly committed to lowering
the 3500 limit. 126 The origination requirement is surely a major
step towards exploiting CATV's capabilities. As the Commission
well recognizes, however, it is no guarantee that CATVs will
Origination Order, supra note 72, at 10,902.
In National Ass'n of Theatre Owners v. FCC, 420 F.2d 194 (D.C. Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 922 (1970), the court expressly reserved decision on
the "difficult question" of whether the Commission could regulate STV rates. Id.
at 202.
121 Botein, The FCC's Proposed CATV Regulations,,55 Cornell L. Rev. 244,
257 (1970).
122 Public Dividend Notice, supra note 72, at 11,048.
123 47 C.F.R. § 74.1111(a) (1970). This requirement was first imposed in 1968
and was reaffirmed in the latest proposed regulations. See First Report and Order,
20 F.C.C.2d 201 (1969); Origination Order, supra note 72, at 10,901. A CATV recently filed suit challenging the origination requiremel!t. Broadcasting, Oct. 19, 1970,
at 40-41. Its chance of success seems minimal in light of the broad grant of authority
the Commission derives from the "reasonably ancillary" test. See note 94 supra•
. 124 Origination Order, supra note 72, at 10,901.
12li 47 C.F.R. § 74.11U(a) (1970).
126 First Report and Order, 20 F.C.C.2d 201,213 (1969).
110

120
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actually originate high quality programming.127 Setting standards
for CATV origination, let alone enforcing them, is a pragmatically
and constitutionally difficult task; nevertheless, it will eventually
have to be faced. The Commission has already applied its traditional doctrines of equal time, fairness and sponsorship identification to CATV.128 It is only a small step for the Commission to
create a CATV equivalent of the Blue Book-its general guidelines for broadcast programming.129
The origination requirement is, however, only the most
conspicuous aspect of the Commission's plans for CATV development. The Commission has also been moving in two other highly
important fields-technical standards and CATV ownership.
On the technical front, the Commission has for the first time
proposed minimal CATV operating standards.130 These are vital
to protect the individual CATV subscriber and to make possible
future CATV interconnection and thus CATV "networks." Requiring type-approval of all CATV equipment would obviously
be a more effective guarantee of interconnection ability. The
Commission, however, specifically declined to do so on the ground
that the proposed standards would hopefully create the "degree
of compatability" necessary for interconnection.l3l Whether or
not this is so, at least they should encourage standardization
among equipment manufacturers. Finally, the proposed standards
also reflect the Commission's new interest in CATV's multichannel capability; the Commission put CATVs "on notice" that
it would demand expanded channel capacity-up to perhaps as
many as forty channels-and also indicated that it might require
CATVs to be equipped for two-way operation and local program
production.132
The Commission has only now begun to act on CATVownership problems.133 First it has finally attacked the very common127 Origination Order, supra note 72, at lO,~Ol-92.
128 First Report and Order, 20 F.C.C.2d 201 (1969).
129 FCC, Report on Public Service Responsibility of a Broadcast Licensee
(1946).

130 Technical Notice, supra note 72.
131 Id. at 11,038.
132 Id. at 11,037.
133 The issue was first raised in First Report, 1 F.C.C.2d 387

(1965). This proceeding was terminated by Order, 7 F.C.C.2d 856 (1967), and a new proceeding was
begun. Notice of Inquiry, 7 F.C.C.2d 853 (1967). The problem was eventually incorporated in the 1968 proposed rules proceeding. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
and Notice of Inquiry, 15 F.C.C.2d 417, 428 (1968).
To a limited extent the local governments and states have also been active in
this area. N.Y.C. Contract, supra note 7, § 18 contains a very broad ban on crossownership by any other local communications medium. See also Vera Institute of
Justice, A Report on New York City's Options for Cable Television Franchises 11
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and perhaps most insidious-problem of cross-ownership of
CATVs and television stations. The proposed regulations contain
an outright ban on CATV ownership by any local television
station or national television networkP' The basis for the ban,
however, is somewhat less than clear. In theory the public dividend plan's provision for commercial substitution should erase the
most dangerous aspect of local cross-ownership-i.e., a local
station's deliberate downgrading of the local CATV in order to
protect itseIf13u-by insulating the local station from audience
loss. Therefore, the Commission's reasoning is probably based
more on a desire for diversity of opinion-more "voicesIl136-than
on traditional economic considerations. But adherence to this rationale should also require banning CATV ownership by all other
local major communications media since such a restriction would
also create more "voices." These situations, however, may seem
less dangerous to the Commission because they provide a much
less powerful incentive for the cross-owner to deliberately downgrade the CATV.137 Finally, considering the ease with which
divestiture of CATVs can be accomplished, the effectiveness of
the remedy seems questionable.13s
Second, the Commission recently imposed a blanket ban on
telephone company ownership of telephone-based CATVs.139 This
merely formalized the Commission's previous practice of refusing
to grant certificates of public convenience and necessity to telephone companies for leasing of lines to their subsidiary or affiliated
CATVs.140 The more recent codification and expansion of the ban
reflects the Commission's fear that telephone companies will use
their monopoly position to force out all other potential CATV
operators and thus preclude future CATV-telephone company
(1970); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 711.170 (1969) which provides that CATV ownership
may not be changed without the state commission's permission. More recently, the
Connecticut Co=ission was upheld in its attempt to regulate CATV ownership.
Connecticut Television, Inc. v. Public Uti!. Co='n, 19 P & F Radio Reg. 2d 2001
(Conn. Sup. Ct. 1970).
134 Cross ownership Order, supra note 72.47 C.F.R. § 74.1131(a) (1970).
13G Barnett, Cable Television and Media Concentration, Part I: Control of the
Cable Systems by Local Broadcasters, 22 Stan. L. Rev. 221, 247 (1970).
130 Multiple Ownership Notice, supra note 72, at 11,042. See Barnett, supra
note 135, at 309.
137 Radio/CATV cross ownership may be less pernicious than television/CATV
cross-ownership in that the two media have largely different audiences. See Barnett,
supra note 135, at 323.
13S One network merely spun-off its interests into a new corporation staffed
by its former employees. Broadcasting, July 6,1970, at 19.
139 Final Report and Order, 18 P & F Radio Reg. 2d 1549 (1970).
140 General Tel. Co., 13 P & F Radio Reg. 2d 667, 683 (F.C.C. 1968), aff'd,
413 F.2d 390 (D.C. Cir.) , cert. denied, 396 U.S. 888 (1969).
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competition. l4l Unfortunately, practice seems to indicate that
these fears are well-founded. H2
Finally, the Commission has attacked the problem of multiple CATV systems through two alternative proposals.BS The
first, apparently the product of a compromise between the Commission's General Counsel and Cable Television Bureau,144 would
limit a multiple owner to a total of fifty CATVs, with further
limitations on the number allowed within various Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSAs), states and adjoining states,
e.g., only two CATVs within the top ten SMSAs, five within the
same state and ten within adjoining states. HIS All numbers are
reduced substantially where the CATV owner also has other major
media interests.u6 Despite the fact that the numbers are necessarily somewhat arbitrary, the basic thrust of the proposal is
sensible since it would prevent both national and local concentration of CATV ownership. The use of SMSAs as a base of
computation, however, creates difficulties because there is no correlation between the size of an SMSA and the size of a CATV's
franchise area. Thus, a CATV owner with two 50,000 person franchise areas and a CATV owner with two 100,000 person franchise
areas within the top ten SMSAs would both be barred from further CATV acquisitions within the top ten SMSAs, even though
the latter has twice as many potential subscribers as the former.
The basic difficulty with the proposal is that it does not consider
actual population or subscription figures. On the other hand, the
second proposal, which apparently originated with the Commission
itself,147 is based solely on total number of subscribers; it would
simply limit a CATV owner to a total of two million subscribers.148 The upper limit imposed by this second proposal seems
quite reasonable. Based on a very liberal figure of 50 per cent
national CATV penetration-i.e., about 28,500,000 television
homes-this would allow a bare minimum of only fourteen mulFinal Report and Order, 18 P & F Radio Reg. 2d 1549, 1567-68 (1970).
For example, in International Cable Television Corp. v. All Metal Fabricators, Inc., 66 P.U.R.3d 448 (Cal. Pub. UtiI. Co='n 1966), a CATV complained
that a local telephone company discriminated against it in making available pole
attachments. The California Commission sympathized, but said it had no jurisdiction over that phase of the telephone company's operations.
143 Multiple Ownership Notice, supra note 72, at 11,043.
144 See Broadcasting, June 15, 1970, at 18.
145 Multiple Ownership Notice, supra note 72, at 11,043.
141
142

146Id.
141 See Broadcasting, June 15, 1970, at 18.
148 Multiple Ownership Notice, supra note

72, at 11,043. It also provides for a
10% iricrease over this figure in any given community if necessary to serve new
subscribers.
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tiple owners and thus avoid the present oligopoly market situation
of the three national broadcast networks. But the second proposal,
unlike the first, would allow an undue concentration of CATV
ownership in any given part of the nation. A truly adequate proposal should combine the first proposal's geographical limitations
and the second proposal's numerical limitations.
The Commission has made a good start towards forceful and
creative development of CATV, though both technical standards
and ownership restrictions might be more detailed and stringent.
At the same time, however, it has failed to act on the very important issue of common carrier access to CATV-a problem
which the Commission consistently delights in raising and then
never resolving.149 The Commission may be somewhat chary of
the subject because it ruled in 1959 that CATV was not a common
carrier.UiO It is, nevertheless, an issue which must be resolved
before CATV achieves large-scale, multi-channel capacity; vesting
control of forty or more communications channels in one entity
invites their abuse. The creation of a common carrier formula is, of
course, far more difficult for CATV than for a telephone or telegraph company. As one commentator has indicated, any definition
of nondiscriminatory access to CATV involves many quasisubjective determinations, e.g., evaluating the time shown, the
channel used and the adjacent programs.151 Although the problem
is obviously not subject to exact resolution, some attempt must
be made to formulate standards. The Commission's suggestion
that CATVs assign channels to governmental and private groups
is evidence of at least some thought on the subject.

III
CONGRESSIONAL REGULATION OF CATV
Congress obviously has the power to preempt any local, state
or FCC action, but it has never done so despite the flurry of favorable or unfavorable bills which each new FCC ruling on CATV
inevitably produces.152 Congress' main role in the area of CATV
~ 140 Origination Order, supra note 72, at 10,902; Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Notice of Inquiry, 15 F.C.C.2d 417, 443 (1968).
150 Report and Order, 26 F.C.C. 403, 427-28 (1959). It should be noted that
this ruling was made at a time when the Commission was avoiding jurisdiction over
CATV.
151 Johnson, supra note 7, at 57-59. Compare the optimism in Vera Institute of
Justice, supra note 133, at 9-10. With somewhat more candor, another commentator
flatly states that no one has yet produced any workable, specific plans for CATV
common carrier status. Barnett, supra note 135, at 244.
152 For example, Representative Stratton obviously disliked the FCC's interim
procedures, see text accompanying note 71 supra, and introduced a number of
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regulation has, instead, been based on its control of the copyright
law. It was never very clear whether a CATV's use of television
signals subjected it to copyright liability/53 and in 1968 the
Supreme Court confirmed copyright owners' worst fears by hold~
ing that it did not.154 Nevertheless, practically no one, including
the CATV industry, disputes that CATV should be required to
make some form of copyright payment; 1155 the problem for Con·
gress has been deciding the form of the liability. Unrestricted
CATV copyright liability is not a feasible solution, since it would
invite television stations, networks and independent producers
to put CATV out of business.156 Congress, however, has been un·
able to create a politically acceptable form of restricted liability,
even though it has been attempting to revise the general copy·
right law since 1965.157 In 1968 the FCC appeared ready to take
the copyright law into its own hands by imposing the retrans~
mission consent requirement; 158 but since that time, it seems to
have reevaluated its statutory powers and retreated.lI59
Congress has produced two copyright bills containing CATV
provisions, the first in 1967 and the second in 1969. Although
neither was ever reported out of committee/GO the bills are note~
worthy for they demonstrate both the evolution of congressional
thought on CATV and the direction of future CATV legislation.
The first bill,l6l bearing a marked resemblance to the FCC's 1968
proposed regulations,t62 would have allowed CATVs, subject to
certain limitations,163 to carry aU local signals without copyright
measures to invalidate them. H.R. 10,268, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); H.R. Con.
Res. 206, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); H.R. Con. Res. 205, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1969).
153 In Report and Order, 26 F.C.C. 403, 438-39 (1959), the FCC requested
Congress to amend § 325 of the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 325(a)
(1964), to require CATVs to get retransmission consent.
154 Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968).
155 E.g., NCTA Resolution, supra note 12, § 1 provided for limited copyright
liability.
156 Botein, supra note 121, at 247.
157 See H.R. Rep. No. 83, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1967).
158 See text accompanying note 75 supra.
159 See note 75 supra.
160 See note 97 supra.
161 S. 597, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 111 (1967).
162 Unlike the proposed regulations, however, the bill gave CATVs what
amounted to a compulsory license to carry distant signals in two narrow situations:
1) where the CATV's area received less than all three network signals and either no
station within the area had an exclusive license or the CATV had not been given
notice thereof, and 2) where there was no television station at all within the CATV's
area.ld. §§ 11l(c) (1), (d) (3). Thus while the bill did contain the important compulsory license, its stringent distant signal provisions would have made CATV
nothing more than a carrier of network programming.
163 See generally id. §§ 111(b) (1)-(6).
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liability,164 while imposing full copyright liability on the importation of distant signals.loD This free carriage of local signals is
somewhat anomalous since there seems little reason why a CATV
should pay for distant, but not local signals. The FCC and the
Congress may, of course, have assumed that advertisers would
continue to pay local stations, and thus ultimately copyright
owners, for local signals carried by CATV. This assumption is,
however, totally inconsistent with traditional notions of CATV
audience fragmentation.
The second billr a unlike the first, seemed to have reflected
the efforts of the CATV and the television industries rather than
the FCC.167 Under this bill a CATV would have had a compulsory
license to carry all local signals16S and subject to narrow limitations,16° a compulsory license to import enough distant signals to
give its subscribers "adequate service.m70 Moreover, the FCC
was authorized to increase the number of signals constituting
"adequate service",171 thus making a type of public dividend plan
possible under the bilJ.172 Under such a plan, most major market
CATVs would have been able to import at least some distant
signals. In the very large markets like New York City, however,
the local signals alone would have provided more than "adequate
service." Thus, without FCC authorization CATVs in such areas
would have been prevented from importing any distant signals.
This seems inequitable in light of the size of these markets. To
remedy this, perhaps the bill should have recognized a third type
of "adequate service" for very large markets.
Also, the second bill would have established a far more
sophisticated compulsory licensing system which would have
avoided forcing CATVs and copyright owners to negotiate directly; instead, it would have required that CATVs make royalty
payments to the Register of Copyrights, who in turn would have
164 rd. § 111 (a) (3).
rd. § 111(c)(5)(B).
S. 543, 9Ist Cong., 1st Sess. § 111 (c) (1) (B) (1969).
161 It follows the NCTA Resolution, supra note 12, to a great extent.
16S S. 543, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. § 111(c)(I)(B) (1969). NCTA Resolution,
supra note 12, § l(a)(l) contained a similar provision.
160 There are limitations where an e."!:clusive license or a blacked-out sports
event is involved. S. 543, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 111(b)(4) (1969). See also NCTA
Resolution, supra note 12, §§ 2(1)-(3).
170 The bill defined adequate service in the top 50 markets as three network
stations, three independent stations and one ETV. In all other markets, three network stations, two independent stations and one ETV were required. S. 543, 91st
Cong., 1st Scss. § 111(d)(3). NCTA Resolution, supra note 12, § l(a)(2) defined
"adequate service" as three network stations and three independent stations.
171 S. 543, 9Ist Cong., 1st Sess. § 111 (c) (2) (B) (1969).
172 See te.-:t accompanying notes 96-98.
lOu
106
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allocated these payments among the copyright owners.178 The
amount of the copyright payments, however, may have been excessive for two reasons. First, the bill would have required CATVs
to pay 5 per cent of gross receipts174-an amount which seems
somewhat arbitrary.175 Second, this payment would have been in
addition to the proposed 2 per cent local franchise fee 176 and the
5 per cent public dividend.177 As a result, a CATV would have
had to overcome an initial minimum loss of 12 per cent of its
gross receipts. This burden seems especially severe considering
that a CATV incurs its greatest expenses in beginning operations.178 The FCC and the Congress may have felt that CATV is
sufficiently profitable to carry such a financial burden;179 or, on
the other hand, they may have assumed that the increased costs
would simply be passed on to subscribers. Nevertheless, although
some form of CATV limited copyright liability will be essential in
any future legislation, the total burden placed upon CATV should
not be prohibitive.
The second bill was an improvement over the first since it
contained far less in the way of regulatory provisions, an area
properly left to the FCC and state and local governments.l80 Although the bill would have expressly preempted any interference
with a CATV's carriage of a signal for which it had a compulsory
license,181 it would have imposed no other restrictions on FCC,
state and local action, and thus presumably left intact the present
division of jurisdiction.
Despite the somewhat less than glorious history of politicallymandated Senate inaction, past proposals do suggest the direction
which future legislation will probably take. The improved compulsory licensing provisions of the second bill indicate that this
system, or some variation of it, is here to stay; the main political infighting between television and CATV interests will now
173 S. 543, 9Ist Cong., 1st Sess. § 111(d) (1969).
174 rd.
175 Depending on the amount of signals used by the CATV, the amount necessary to compensate copyright owners will vary greatly. See Staff Report, supra note
74, at 33-34.
176 See text accompanying note 16 supra.
177 See text accompanying note 81 supra.
178 See text accompanying note 50 supra.
179 Once established, CATVs are highly profitable. A 1965 survey showed an
average profit margin of 57% before taxes. M. Seiden, An Economic Analysis of
Community Antenna Television Systems and the Television Broadcast Industry 27
(1965).
180 See Comment, The Copyright Law and Its Relevance to CATV: Can an
Old Dog Be Taught New Tricks, 19 Buff. L. Rev. 65, 88 (1969),
181 S. 543, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 111(c) (1969).
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center on substantive provisions of the system-i.e., the number
of signals licensed and the size of payments required. Furthermore, the second bill's small number of regulatory provisions is
also indicative of the future; Congress seems to recognize that
regulatory policies should be implemented by the regulatory
agency and, to a lesser extent, by the relevant state and local
bodies.

IV
CONCLUSION

Despite its hesitant and uncoordinated beginnings, multijurisdictional regulation of CATV seems to be the trend of the
future. State and local bodies have the potential to exercise the
closest, most flexible regulation. Federal agencies, on the other
hand, can provide the framework for developing uniform regulations and standards. Hopefully, some of the inefficiency and
confusion of the past can be avoided by coordinated efforts on
all jurisdictional levels.
On the federal level the FCC has recently demonstrated a
willingness and ability to exert leadership in the area. Its proposed
regulations, although not without problems, remove some of the
stumbling blocks to full CATV development and are a major step
in accommodating the often conflicting interests of CATV and
broadcast television. Congressional attempts to resolve the copyright problems raised by CATV have been less encouraging.
Political pressures have thwarted passage of two recent bills.
Nevertheless, these bills indicate the ultimate form of Congress'
response to the copyright problem.
CATV regulation is still in its infancy and confusion is widespread; but efforts are finally being made at all levels to minimize
the inevitable growing pains. Increased cooperation and creative
leadership will allow CATV to realize its full potential as an effective communications medium.
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